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The aim of this paper is to explore the heterogeneity in R&D collaborations and of their 
determinants and motives. Using a recent French survey on research and innovation relations, we 
first show the heterogeneity of such relations thanks to a typology of their characteristics: their 
nature (common research, sub-contracting, multi-partnership, management of a common structure), 
organizational arrangement (contract, specific investments), duration and type of research (market-
oriented vs. research-oriented). Five categories of collaborations are obtained from different 
combinations of these relational characteristics. Using a multinomial logit estimation (and testing 
for the IIA assumption), we then try to explain how this diversity of partnerships is related to a 
broad set of explanatory variables (economic rationale for the cooperation, knowledge spillovers, 
appropriability conditions and partners’ individual characteristics). Thanks to this original approach, 
we have obtained new results on R&D cooperation motives. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Innovation  is  considered  as  a  source  of  increased  productivity  and  economic  growth. 
Moreover, it is more and more frequently the fruit of collaborative work because innovation 
generally requires the combination of various sources of knowledge. As a consequence, the 
number of R&D cooperations between firms and between firms and public institutions has 
increased sharply in the last few years (Hagedoorn, 2002; Mansfield et Lee, 1996; Mowery, 
1998; OCDE, 2000); this increase has also been reinforced by the financial support the State 
has provided so as to promote knowledge sharing and creation.  
 
Thus, R&D collaborations are considered as strategic relations for firms. Three main strands 
of theoretical literature examine firms’ incentives to form research partnerships (Hagedoorn et 
al.,  2000).  In  the  strategic  management  theory,  which  concentrates  on  the  internal 
organization  of  firms’  activities,  the  rationale  for  R&D  cooperation  is  linked  to  the 
exploitation  of  complementary  competencies  or  knowledge  (e.g.  Teece,  1986;  Kogut  and 
Zander, 1992). From a transaction cost perspective, cooperation is seen as a hybrid form of 
organization which in certain circumstances can be a preferable alternative to the market or 
the hierarchy. Finally, the Industrial organization theory, focusing on the role of knowledge 
spillovers on R&D efforts, examines the incentives for firms to conduct R&D cooperative 
projects with competitors  and the effects on social welfare of this type of R&D cooperation 
(e.g. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). Hagedoorn et al. (2000), using 
a  synthethis  of  these  theories,  provide  a  description  of  the  potential  benefits  of  R&D 
collaboration.  Cooperation  enables  firms  to  internalize  knowledge  spillovers,  facilitates 
knowledge transfers between them (in particular between firms and universities), helps them 
gain  access  to  complementary  knowledge  and  technologies,  generates  scale  economies  of 
research, enables firms to speed the commercialization of new products or technologies, to 
avoid duplicative R&D efforts, to share costs and uncertainty, to gain access to foreign or new 
markets.  
 
Thus,  much  literature  has  been  written  about  the  motives  for  and  potential  benefits  of 
cooperation and about the obstacles to cooperative relations as well as the factors of their 
success.  But, although cooperation enables firms to meet various needs and reach certain 
goals,  it  has  been  largely  ignored  in  literature  and  the  heterogeneity  of  the  types  of 
cooperations has been overlooked. As a consequence, our understanding of the determinants 
and effects of R&D cooperation agreement remains limited. Some scholars have emphasized 
the need for a more sophisticated and multifaceted approach to cooperation (see for instance 
Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). Thus, some authors (Kaiser, 2002; Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002; Fritsch and Lucas, 2001; Leiponen, 2001; Tether, 2002; Belderdos et al., 2004; Lopez, 
2006) have started to examine the nature of the partners in order to deepen the study of the 
motives  and  determinants  of  R&D  cooperation.  They  show  that  the  determinants  of  and 
motives  for  cooperation  vary  according  to  the  type  of  partners  (competitor,  customer  or 
supplier,  academic  actors).  In  particular,  the  R&D  intensity  is  a  significant  explanatory   3 
variable  of  cooperation  with  customers,  suppliers  and  academic  partners  but  it  does  not 
explain cooperation with competitors (Belderdos et al., 2004). Moreover, the risk constraint 
only has an impact on cooperation with competitors or suppliers (Belderdos et al., 2004). 
However, these studies are based on the hypothesis that one type of partner is associated to 
one type of cooperation. In other words, it is assumed that a firm always follows the same 
strategy with a given partner, for instance when it collaborates with a public laboratory. The 
results  of  several  studies  show  that  this  hypothesis  is  not  satisfactory  (see  for  instance, 
Carayol, 2003; Levy et al., 2006, in the case of public-private research partnerships). 
 
In this paper, we go further in this direction, and explore the heterogeneity of the forms of 
R&D  collaboration.  Our  aim  is  to  examine  the  various  ways  in  which  (French)  firms 
collaborate and to analyse the strategies that lead to those different types of collaboration.   
We expect a strong correlation between the decision of a firm to engage in a particular type of 
R&D collaboration and the nature of its expected benefits. In order to show this correlation, 
we first propose a typology of the forms of collaboration, based on a large sample of R&D 
collaboration agreements. Then, using a multinomial logit, we test the influence of a broad set 
of factors (size of the firm, belonging to a group, R&D intensity of the firm, of its partner, 
type of motives, incoming spillovers, appropriability conditions …) on the chosen form of 
collaboration. Our data come from the survey of inter-firm relations (ERIE) conducted in 
2003 by the French institutes of statistics (Sessi, Scees, DPE, Insee). The aim of this survey 
was to provide an overview of interfirm relations. More precisely, the survey studies the firms 
engaged in cooperative relationships. Our sample comprises firms that have declared having 
at least one R&D/ innovation cooperative relationship with another organization (1743 firms); 
these firms are engaged in 3297 relationships, out of which 3072 can be exploited in the 
framework of our econometric analyses.  
 
The article is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly present our data. In 
Section 3, we present and discuss the typology we obtained. In Section 4, we propose a short 
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature related to the determinants and motives of 
R&D collaboration. We also present our empirical approach. Our results are discussed in 
Section 5. The last section concludes.  
 
 
2.  The data 
 
The data used for our research come from a French survey of inter-business relationships 
(ERIE survey), conducted in 2003 by the French institutes of statistics (Sessi, Scees, DPE, 
Insee) and coordinated at European level. It aimed to provide an overview of the relations 
between firms (and other actors) involving a minimum level of cooperation
1. The survey 
concentrated on five main aspects of firms’ activities:  production, procurement, marketing, 
                                                 
1 This means that usual relations between client and supplier are not covered here (nor purely financial relations).   4 
R&D  and  innovation,  ancillary  services  (transport,  advertising…).  For  each  of  these 
functions, firms were asked to describe no more than three of their strategic relationships. 
When they were involved in several cooperative relationships with other organizations, they 
were asked to choose the most three strategic relationships. Two types of questions were 
asked: questions concerning the partner (nature, location, selection criteria …) and questions 
concerning  the  relationship  itself  (duration,  nature  of  R&D,  economic  rationale  for  the 
relationship,  outputs  ...).  7611  firms  were  interviewed  for  each  relationship  and  for  each 
function. The sample, representative in size and sector, comprises 932 firms from the food 
sector (Scees), 4175 from the industrial sector (Sessi), 1845 firms from the service sector 
(Insee) and 659 are R&D firms (DEP). 
 
Out of all the firms in the sample, we have selected those declaring having at least one R&D 
cooperation relationship. Table 1 reports some sample statistics. It turns out that 1775 firms in 
the  sample  have  at  least  one  R&D  cooperation  relationship  with  another  organization 
(23.32%). Becker and Dietz (2004) find that about 37% of German firms collaborate with 
other organizations to jointly develop new products. Tether (2002) finds that 45% of English 
innovating  firms  cooperate  with  other  organizations.  As  half  of  the  firms  of  his  sample 
innovate, we can consider that our figure is similar to his. 18.9% of innovative Spanish firms 
cooperate (Lopez, 2006). It seems then that Spanish cooperate less than other firms. 
 
The firms of our sample that cooperate with other organizations develop on average 8.94 
cooperative relationships but the standard error is large (34.8) and the median is only of 2 
relationships.  Among firms in the sample that cooperate with others, almost half only have 
one cooperative relationship (47.72%), 9% of them declare five or more relationships.  
 
Table 1. Number of relationships initiated for the purpose of research and innovation  
 
 
Source : Erie Survey (authors’ calculation) 
 
With this sample of cooperative firms, we are confronted with the fact that a firm can describe 
one, two or three partnerships: how can we deal with this problem especially since there is a 
priori no preference order in the answers between those relations?  In order to solve this 
problem, we build a new database on relations (and not on firms). The initial database has as 
many observations as firms interviewed. It is presented in Table 2. For instance, firm I only 




1  47.72        
2  14.93        
3  16.28        
4  12.23        
5 (or more)  8.85         5 
 
Table 2. Presentation of the firm’s sample 
Firms  Relation 1  Relation 2  Relation 3 
I  A     
J  B     
K  C  D   
L  E  F  G 
 
We transform Table 2 into Table 3 in such a manner that the new database has as many 
observations  as  there  are  strategic  relationships  described  by  firms.  Every  observation 
contains  all  the  information  for  each  relationship  and  for  the  partner,  as  well  as  the 
characteristics of the firm that has described this relationship. The sample then contains 3297 
relationships.  
 
Table 3. Presentation of the final sample of relationships 
Relation  Type  Output  Economic rationale  … 
A         
B         
    C…         
G         
 
As  mentioned  before,  the  database  gives  us  information  about  the  characteristics  of  the 
relationships  and  of  the  partners  (from  the  interviewed  firm’s  point  of  view).  Unlike the 
methodology  used  in  other  studies  on  cooperation,  the  Erie  survey  does  not  allow  us  to 
distinguish  between  types  of  partners  (i.e.  cooperation  between  competitors  versus 
cooperation between clients and suppliers). Nevertheless, the survey informs us on the nature 
of the partners, based on their R&D activities: firms engaged in R&D, firms not engaged in 
R&D, consortium and academic partners. The relational variables are used to build a typology 
of the different forms of cooperation. The second types of variables will allow us to test 
whether the partners’ characteristics contribute to explaining the diversity of the relationships.  
For this second stage of our analysis (Section 4), we also use three other databases. The R&D 
database,  which  comes  from  the  French  Ministry  of  Education  and  Research,  provides 
information on firms’ research expenditures in 2002. The Annual Survey of Firms (EAE) 
conducted in 2002 provides us with information about the individual characteristics of firms 
such as size, sector, turnover and location. Finally, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) 
provides information about spillovers and appropriability conditions. Merging the new sample 
of relationships with those databases, we obtain a final sample of 3072 relationships. 
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3.  Exploring the diversity of collaborative R&D: A multidimensional analysis 
 
As mentioned in Hagedoorn et al. (2000), a unified framework to analyze R&D collaboration 
is not available. In this section, we explore the various forms of collaboration in order to gain 
a better knowledge and understanding of R&D collaboration. Indeed, there are mainly two 
empirical ways of empirically examining R&D relationships. One consists in examining the 
cooperation  partners  (public  with  public  actors  vs.  private  with  competitor,  customer  or 
supplier…). Another one focuses on the level of formality of these relationships (existence of 
a contract or not). Our objective is to  study the particular combinations of those various 
dimensions, which are not independent (Hagedoorn et al., 2000) 
 
3.1.   R&D collaboration characteristics 
 
There  are  many  different  forms  of  R&D  collaboration  and  each  form  is  governed  in  a 
particularly way. We briefly discuss the various characteristics of these relationships. Indeed, 
the various dimensions of the R&D collaboration concern the existence (or not) of a contract, 
the short vs. long term perspective of the cooperation or its market vs. research orientation; 
the types of R&D cooperation formal arrangements (joint venture; joint research; customer-
supplier  relationships  …);  the  duration; the  level  of  partners’  involvement  in  the relation 
through the existence of various specific investments (mode of communication for example). 
 
Following the transaction cost approach, a form of cooperation is chosen in order to minimize 
transaction costs. According to Brockhoff (1992), the presence of a contractual agreement is 
significantly related to the perception of high transaction costs: the higher the transaction 
costs,  the  less  frequent  cooperation  with  no  contractual  agreement.  The  frequency  of 
interactions or usual transactions and the specificity of assets are other factors that increase 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). According to Becker and Dietz (2004), formal R&D 
agreements  are  established  when  no  permanent  market  relations  exist.  The  number  of 
partners, their location (national vs. international partners), and the stage in the life cycle of 
the product has a critical influence on those transaction cost dimensions (Brockhoff, 1992). 
Contractual agreements also allow the firms to reduce uncertainty and to reduce the risk of 
opportunistic  behavior  among  partners.  Thus,  in  highly  strategic  contexts,  collaboration 
partnerships are governed by formal contracts, whereas in the context of commercial relations 
(non  strategic)  there  are  no  such  contracts  (Forsgren  and  Johanson,  1992).  The  types  of 
contracts selected also vary a great deal depending on the types of incentives involved (for 
instance,  majority  vs.  minority  ownerships,  incentive  contracts  such  as  licensing…  see, 
Huber, 2003).  
 
Hagedoorn (1993) proposes a richer taxonomy of the different forms of formal contractual 
agreements  depending  on  the  actors’  objectives:  short-term  technological  achievement  vs. 
long-term positioning (and mixed strategy). In the first case, firms engage in simple contracts 
while in the second case, complex inter-organizational modes of cooperation are necessary.   7 
Complex or strong modes of governance concern joint ventures, research corporation, joint 
R&D or direct investments. On the other hand, short term objectives such as technology 
achievement  or  cost  minimizing  are  achieved  in  the  context  of  simple  contractual 
arrangements (R&D pacts), technology exchange or transfer, or customer-supplier relations. 
Complex modes of R&D cooperation are chosen by firms that have wider objectives (market 
access, technology-related motivation) and which have long term perspectives since they are 
complex to manage. Simple contractual arrangements are better suited for simple applied 
research  objectives.  Nevertheless,  even  if  an  important  variety  of  R&D  cooperative 
agreements exists, the latter can be divided into two categories:  contractual vs. complex 
arrangements  (Hagedoorn,  1993).  Thus,  the  short  vs.  long-term  perspectives  of  the 
cooperation should be considered. The proximity to the market of the outputs the research 
results in (products, patents, publication …) should inform us on the firms’ positioning. 
 
On the other hand, very little is known about informal partnerships (Hagedoorn et al, 2000; 
Bönte and Keilbach, 2005). Nevertheless, we expect that when the partners have a short term 
research objective, their relationships are rather informal. For instance, according to Hall et al 
(1998) “generally, in these relationships, the university is serving in the role of a short-term 
project-specific research subcontractor” (Hall et al., 1998).  
 
Another  related  facet  that  should  be  taken  into  account  is  the  duration  of  the  relation. 
According to Becker and Dietz (2004), “the duration of R&D cooperation and the intensity of 
resource exchange could inform on the decision-making processes and the mechanisms for 
generating synergies and cross-fertilization effects”.  
 
Those dimensions are not independent (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, there are no a priori 
univocal relations between them: for example, “there is no strict correlation between modes of 
cooperation  and  their  strategic  or  cost-economizing  content”  (Hagedoorn,  1993).  For  this 
reason,  we  believe  that  a  typology  is  well-suited  to  our  objectives.  Indeed,  this  method 
enables us to avoid presupposing the existence of relations between those different variables. 
 
Our database allows us to define several variables related to the relationships’ characteristics 
that we will use in order to build the typology of the relations. The variable Research defines 
five  possible  types  of  research:  Common  research,  sub-contracting,  multi-partnerships 
(consortium), management of a common structure and other
2. The variable Duration points 
out if the relation lasts less or more than five years
3. A group of dummy variables describes 
the  organizational  arrangements  of  the  relationship.  The  variable  Contract  indicates  if  a 
contract  was  signed  between  the  partners.  The  variable  ICT  specifies  if  a  specific 
communication  mode  is  built  and  used  by  the  partners.  The  variable  Investment  shows 
                                                 
2 This latter type is quite problematic, as we do not have any information on the modality “other”. 
3 We would have prefer to be able to distinguish three-year-relations, 3 to five years relations and the ones that 
last more than five years, as it seems more precise and more linked to the reality of the relationship. However, 
the survey asks for three types of duration: less than one year, less than five years and more than five years. 
Descriptive statistics show that the only pertinent distinction is more or less than five years.   8 
whether a specific investment is done by one of the partners. This also goes along transaction 
cost  theory  (Williamson,  1991).  When  one  of  the  partners  makes  an  investment  into  the 
relationship, one can assume that the latter is intended as a long term relationship; indeed, the 
specific  asset  is  not  easily  re-usable  without  important  sunk  cost.  The  variable  Comm 
indicates whether the cooperation generates important interactions during the relation to reach 
the fixed goals. The variable Balanced specifies if the relation is considered balanced by the 
interviewed  firm.  Finally,  the  variable  Outputs  indicates  whether  the  results  of  the 
cooperation are rather market oriented (new product or process), or more fundamental (co-





To  study  the  heterogeneity  of  R&D  collaborations,  we  have  performed  a  Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) on the relational variables discussed above and presented in 
detail hereafter, followed by an ascendant hierarchical classification (AHC).  
 
MCA represents a well suited methodology for exploring qualitative data and for analyzing 
the relations between more than two categorical variables that can be presented in multi-way 
contingency  tables.  More  precisely,  the  total  variation  of  the  data  matrix  (the  inertia)  is 
computed by the usual Chi2-statistics which measures the distance separating the original 
distribution from the one insuring the independence of the variables. Three main criteria can 
be  used  to  retain  the  most  discriminating  axes  for  the  analysis:  the  percentage  of  inertia 
explained; the marginal contribution of the axes to the explained inertia; and the general 
meaning of the axis which will constitute the new synthetic variables (Benzécri, 1992). Since 
the more axes are retained for the AHC, the higher the intra-class variance, researchers often 
only keep two or three axes for their analysis. 
 
In a second stage, the individuals’ coordinates on the selected axes are the inputs for the 
AHC, which is used to split the population into homogeneous groups. The AHC algorithm 
proceeds as follows: at each step pairs are formed by merging the closest clusters in order to 
minimize  the  within-type  variance  and  to  maximize  the  between-type  variance.  The 
comparison of these two values (intra vs. inter-class variances) is the criterion used to select 
the number of classes to be retained. Finally, in order to highlight the main characteristics of 
the  individuals  by  class,  the  coordinates  of  the  class  centers  are  represented  on  the  axes 





Our objective is to study the diversity of the R&D cooperative relationships in France. For 
this purpose, we have performed a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) on the variables   9 
characterizing the 3297 relations constituting our population. Four axes explain 41.9 % of the 
total inertia of the data. The coordinates of the individuals (relationships) of the sample on 
these  axes  have  enabled  us  to  create  an  ascending  hierarchical  classification  (AHC)  that 
results in the division of the population into five homogeneous classes (with an intra-class 
variance of 46 % and an inter-class variance of 54 %). In other words these classes comprise 
firms with similar profiles in terms of the variables retained for the analysis. Results show the 
diversity  of  the  inter-firm  relations.  The  centers  of  the  five  classes  obtained  may  be 
represented on the four axes space of the MCA as presented below.  
 
Figure 1. The projection of the five classes’ centers on the first two axes of the MCA. 
 
 
No contract, long-term 












As Figure 1 shows, the first axis (12.2% of the total inertia) accounts for the intensity of the 
collaboration between the partners. It opposes the relationships characterized by important 
joint  efforts  on  both  partners’  part  from  the  relationships  that  are  not  (i.e.  weak 
collaborations). Moreover, a strong collaboration relationship is associated with the existence 
of specific investments, a specific mode of communication and mixed results in terms of 
proximity to the market (i.e. process or product innovations and co-publication or patents). A 
weaker collaboration is associated with a subcontracting relation.  On this axis, the fourth 
class is strongly opposed to class 5. The second axis (11% of the inertia) is opposed to the 
short term (< five years) relations also characterized by the existence of a (written) contract to 
the long-term relations which do not entail the signature of a contract. On this axis, classes 5 
and 2 are opposed to classes 1 and 3. 
   





















The third axe (9.7% of the inertia) accounts for the type of research: common research or 
multi-partnership opposed to the management of a common structure. It also accounts for the 
balanced vs. unbalanced nature of the research. It mainly opposes Classes 2 and 3 to Class 1 
and to a lesser extent Class 4.  Finally, the last axis (9 % of the inertia) accounts for the nature 
of the outputs (more or less proximate to the market) associated to the nature of the research: 
common  research  leading  to  innovation  vs.  multi-partnership  leading  to  patent  or  co-
publication. It opposes Class 2 to Classes 3, 4 and 5. We now discuss the characteristics of 
each class using the analysis of Figures 1 and  2 and Table 4. Then we complement our 
findings with the analysis of supplementary variables (Cf. Table 5). 
 
Class 1 relationships can be qualified as long term relationships for the management of a 
common structure and represent 14 % of the sample. They are long-term partnerships (as 
they  last  more  than  five  years)  the  objective  of  which  is  the  management  of  a  common 
structure (or other type of relations
4). These are long-term relationships with firms that do not 
conduct  R&D  activities,  which  mainly  belong  to  the  same  group  of  companies,  and  are 
located in foreign countries. Another important criterion retained to establish the relationship 
is the guaranty of a long-term relationship. The economic rationale for this relation is based 
on  a  group  logic,  the  search  for  scale  economies  or  the  refocusing  on  the  core 
business/competencies of the firm but not the access to new markets. Logically, such relations 
result from the decision of the group. 
 
Class 2 relationships can be qualified as multi-partnerships in upstream research projects 
and represent 16.4 % of the sample. They are generally evenly balanced (in the sense that 
none of the partners imposes its conditions) and short or medium-term (< five years). They 
                                                 
4 This category is unfortunately not specified in the survey. Nevertheless, as regards the characteristics of this 
class, we may expect it consists in the deliveries of a service that take place within the group.   11 
mainly  consist  in  fundamental  research  generally  achieved  with  several  partners,  within 
consortium, or with a public laboratory. They tend to focus on upstream research outputs such 
as patents, co-publications or software. When these partnerships take the form of consortia, 
they often are European Union projects, such RDFP projects. The main criteria determining 
the choice of such partners are its/their notoriety, competencies, and technical means. The 
economic  rationale  for  establishing  such  relations  is  the  search  for  flexibility  and  scale 
economies.  The  respondents  generally  describe  this  kind  of  partnership  as  non  strategic. 
Indeed, they do not involve any specific investments nor any organizational arrangements (i.e. 
contract).  
 
Table 4. Description of the classes 
Classes  1  2  3  4  5  All 
Number  459  543  900  775  620  3297 
Frequencies (%)  14  16.4  27.3  23.5  18.8  100 
Characteristics of the relation (en %)  
Duration (more than 5 years)  73  34  58  36  45  48 
Unevenly balanced  39  24  9  60  32  32 
Strong cooperation  33  50  62  12  63  44 
Specific communication mode  11  10  5  5  31  12 
Specific investment  13  14  5  4  44  15 
Existence of a contract   30  38  16  29  77  36 
Results : 
-  Upstream outputs (patents, co-publ., software) 
-  Oriented-market  results  (new  products, 
process or prototypes) 































Type of the relation : 
-  Common research  
-  Sub-contracting 
-  Multi-partnership 
-  Management of a common structure 





































Source: Erie Survey (authors’ calculation) 
 
Class 3 relationships are characterized by common market-oriented research and represent 
27.3 % of all relationships and so are the most frequent. They are characterized by common 
market oriented research projects leading to the development of new products or processes. 
They consist in long-term (> five years) and balanced relations. These relations also rest on a 
strong cooperation in terms of interactions and exchange. Nevertheless, they do not involve   12 
specific investments, nor any specific communication means, and not governed by contracts 
either. Firms that get involved in this type of relationship generally do so with firms that 
perform R&D activities.  The partner is often part of the same group and located in another 
European Union country. The main criteria retained to establish the relationship are, as in the 
case of Class 1, a group logic. Moreover, they are rather described as strategic. In the process 
of innovation, the firms interviewed that are involved in this type of relationship are engaged 
in the stage of industrial development.  
 
The relationships in Class 4 are essentially subcontracting relations. They represent 23.5 % 
of the sample. They are logically unbalanced relations (one partner imposes its condition to 
the other). These relations are short or medium-term. Moreover, the relations do not lead to 
any  close  cooperation  between  the  parties.  Such  relationships  do  not  necessitate  specific 
investments or communication means. They lead to oriented-market results. Such relations are 
formed within the region or within France, and less often with firms that belong to the same 
group or with laboratories. Nevertheless, geographical proximity is rather not declared as the 
main determinant of the choice of the partner. The main criteria are: the notoriety of the 
partner, its price and guaranties in terms of quality (label, certification …). This relationship is 
not based on risk sharing. Firms establish relations of this type so as to compensate for the 
absence of internal competencies, skills and equipments in the area.  
 
Relations in Class 5 are contractual relationships based on a strong collaboration and 
involvement. They represent 18.8 % of the collaborations in our sample. The results of these 
relationships  are  varied  in  nature:  co-publications  and/or  patents  and  new  products  or 
processes or prototypes. These relations differ from other classes in that they are characterized 
by important mechanisms used to facilitate and control the cooperation. Thus, a contract is 
often signed and a specific investment is made by at least one of the partners. A specific 
communication mode is adopted. They involve a joint effort of the partners and are therefore 
based on strong collaboration. Two main characteristics of these relationships are, first of all 
that the partners share the risks, and second of all that the relationship itself is strategic in 
nature. Even if these relationships are often achieved with public labs, firms also have an 
upstream  role  in  the  cooperation  (research,  experimental  development).  One  of  the  main 
reasons for the choice of a particular partner lies in the fact that the latter’s competencies and 
technical resources complement those of the firm. The notoriety of the partner as well as the 
guaranty of a long-term engagement are the other determining criteria of this choice. Firms 
that develop this type of relationship do so for various economic reasons: such a relationship 
could enable them to focus on their core competencies/business and so help them to gain 
access to new markets, compensate for the absence of internal competencies and equipment, 
or improve their flexibility.    13 
Table 5. Additional variables (contributions to the Chi2) 
Classes  Chi
2  1  2  3  4  5 
The partner :             
Nature : 
-  Firm with R&D 
-  Firm without R&D 
-  Consortium or technical center 
-  Laboratory, associations 

































-  Local 
-  Regional  
-  France 
-  Europe 
-  Other country 






























Criteria for its choice : 
-  Group 
-  Technical  means,  know-how,  competencies 
complementarity 
-  Notoriety 
-  Price/Quality 
-  Geographical proximity 

















































The relation  : 
Economic rationale: 
-  Group mode of organization  
-  Absence of internal competencies/skills 
-  Absence of equipments 
-  Search for flexibility 
-  Search for scale economies 
-  Access to new markets 


















































Role of the firm (respondent) in the relation : 
-  Research  
-  Experimental development 
-  Industrial development 





























Shared risk  ***      (-)  --  ++ 
Strategic nature of the relation  ***    --  +    + 
γ This variable is provided for 2,353 relationships only. 
Source: Erie Survey (authors’ calculation) 
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4. Explaining the heterogeneity of R&D collaborations 
 
The literature underlines that it is necessary to examine the various types of agreements and 
not just to consider that cooperation always takes the same form. Indeed, agreements reveal 
important differences in the ways cooperation projects are managed and performed.  (Lopez, 
2006;  Belderbos  et  al.,  2004;  Cassiman  and  Veugelers,  2005).  We  consider  that  the 
cooperation  can  be  simultaneously  determined  by  three  types  of  variables:  the  economic 
rationale  for  the  cooperation  (the  motives),  knowledge  spillovers  and  appropriability 
conditions and finally the partners’ characteristics (absorptive capacity, belonging to the same 
group), contrary to the literature that often study one or two of theses dimensions. 
 
4.1 Motives for participating in R&D cooperation: hypotheses 
 
4.1.1 Economic rationales 
 
The  literature  in  economics  and  management  underlines  the  diversity  of  the  motives  to 
cooperate. According to the cost transaction theory, cooperation helps reduce opportunism 
and the risk for the transaction (Williamson, 1991). In the resource based theory, cooperation 
allows for the transfer of complementary skills (Ciborra, 1991; Mitchell and Singh, 1992…), 
which cannot be transmitted through market-based transactions. R&D cooperation is then 
seen as a means to internalize and combine complementary, untradable resources (Barney, 
1991). Cooperation is then considered as a mechanism to maximize firm’s value through 
effectively combining the resources of the partners by exploiting complementarities (Kogut, 
1988; Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Compared to R&D projects undertaken by individual firms, 
cooperative  R&D  projects  are  thought  to  reduce  research  time  (Contractor  and  Lorange, 
1988). Cooperation also enables firms to reduce the costs of research by sharing them with the 
partners. Sakakibara points out that scale-based R&D cooperation requires a relatively clearer 
understanding of the objective and configuration of a cooperative R&D project: the sources of 
economies of scale must be identified by both partners before the execution of the project. 
This means that not all cooperative relationships are motivated by this reason; indeed it is not 
always possible beforehand to know precisely how the project will proceed and therefore to 
identify  the  economies  of  scale  that  will  be  realized.  Finally,  R&D  alliances  are  also 
competitive  strategies  to  gain  market  share,  innovative  edge,  or  to  build  entry  barriers 
(Vickers, 1985).  
 
Thus, various motives for cooperation are discussed in the literature but we do not know if 
these motives correspond to different forms of cooperation. Besides, as Sakakibara (1997) 
notices, cost-sharing and skill-sharing motives are not necessarily exclusive even if for the 
firms  interviewed  gaining  access  to  complementary  knowledge  is  the  most  important 
objective of the project and sharing fixed cost is one of the least important objectives. Tether 
(2002) shows that firms sometimes cooperate when they face different difficulties. Lopez 
(2006) emphasizes that cost-risk sharing and, to a lesser extent, complementarities strongly   15 
impact the probability of cooperating whatever the nature of partners (with the exception of 
competitors). Belderbos et al. (2004) stress that cost constraint motivates cooperation with 
public research institutes while risk constraint influences cooperation between competitors 
and  between  suppliers.  We  make  the  hypothesis  that  the  different  motives  can  help 
differentiate the different types of cooperation, without the motives being exclusive of one 
another. For instance, a need for complementary skills can be an explanation for all types of 
cooperation, whereas a lack of equipment is a good explanation for why a firm chooses the 
subcontracting solution; indeed the firm might not wish to purchase equipment that it will 
only  need  temporarily.  As  for  risk  sharing,  it  has  a  strong  impact  on  upstream  research 
cooperation.   
 
4.1.2  Knowledge spillovers and appropriability conditions 
 
Theoretical industrial organization literature considers that R&D cooperation allows firms to 
internalize knowledge spillovers (De Bondt, 1996) whether they cooperate with competitors 
(d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), customers or suppliers (Atallah, 2002; Inkmann, 2001). 
Most theoretical models show that a high level of knowledge spillovers increases a firm’s 
probability of cooperating.   
 
However, empirical analyses show different results. Cassiman and Veuglers (2002) who have 
measured  spillovers  by  the  relevance  of  public  information  sources  (such  as  patent 
information) show that the estimated coefficient of their spillovers measure is statistically 
insignificant for vertical cooperation. Belderbos et al. (2004) demonstrate that the probability 
of cooperating increases with incoming spillovers when the firm and its partners are similar in 
nature. For instance, cooperation with a customer benefits from customer spillovers but not 
from  supplier  spillovers.  Moreover,  every  type  of  cooperation  benefits  from  institutional 
incoming spillovers (that is issued from universities) but not from public incoming spillovers 
(that is patent, database, trade literature and fairs). Thus, the empirical analysis takes more 
into account the nature of the partner and shows that the impact is not always verified.  
 
If firms try to increase incoming spillovers, they also attempt to appropriate the benefits of 
their innovations by controlling information flows out of the firm (Belderbos et al., 2004), in 
order  to  reduce  outgoing  spillovers.  Indeed,  imperfect  appropriability  increases  the 
cooperating firms’ temptation to free ride on each other’s R&D investments (e.g. Shapiro and 
Willig, 1990; Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1994) and encourages outsiders to free ride on the 
R&D efforts of the cooperation partners (Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999). Thus firms are likely 
to take into account appropriability conditions when entering into cooperation agreements 
with other organizations (Bönte and Keilbach, 2005). 
 
The results of empirical studies on the role of knowledge appropriability on the choice of 
cooperation  relationships  are  not  all  similar.  Belderbos  et  al.  (2004)  show  that  outgoing 
spillovers  do  not  have  any  impact  on  the  probability  to  cooperate,  whatever  the  partner.   16 
Kaiser (2002) studying the German service sector shows that measures of outgoing spillovers 
are not statistically significant on the probability to cooperate. Hernan et al. (2003) find that 
the effect on cooperation of the level of appropriability is statistically significant and negative.  
 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) propose two measures of appropriability. They show that a 
greater  appropriability  of  results  of  the  innovation  process  (lower  outgoing  spillovers), 
measured by firm-specific protection mechanism (such as secrecy) increases the probability of 
cooperating  with  customers  or  suppliers  but  is  unrelated  to  cooperative  agreements  with 
research institutes. The industry-specific legal protection mechanisms (such as patents) have 
no impact on the probability to cooperate. 
 
The diversity of the results suggests that appropriability and incoming spillovers can have 
different impacts depending on the type of partners. It does not allow us to propose a robust 
hypothesis.  
 
4.1.3  Firms Absorptive capacity (R&D, size) 
 
The size of the firm 
In  the  economic  literature,  the  size  of  the  firm  partly  explains  the  latter’s  strategies  and 
behaviors. Thus, Link and Bauer (1987), Vonortas (1997), Fritsch and Lukas (2001), Tether 
(2002)  find  that  the  firm’s  size,  measured  by  the  number  of  employees,  increases  the 
propensity to cooperate. We can then expect to find this result in our model. However, this 
relation is not so obvious. Indeed, small firms might have the greater need for co-operative 
agreements because in general they have fewer internal resources. But whilst large firms have 
greater  internal  resources,  they  are  also  likely  to  engage  in  a  wider  range  of  activities, 
including some that might benefit from cooperation (Tether, 2002). The firm’s size itself 
therefore  gives  little  indication  as  to  whether  or  not  firms  might  engage  in  cooperative 
arrangement. Rather it is because the size of the firm proxies for (market) power that it is 
likely  to  influence  the  configuration  of  such  arrangements  (Tether,  2002).  Moreover, 
Kleinknecht and Van Reijnen (1992) confirm that this hypothesis must be considered with 
caution as their results show that the firm’s size has no significant influence on the probability 
of R&D cooperation. However, we expect that big firms are more likely than small firms to 
undertake  upstream  research  cooperation,  as  this  type  of  research  often  requires  more 
investment and equipment.  
 
R&D intensity 
The second characteristic we consider is the R&D intensity. We can expect R&D intensity to 
impact positively on the probability of cooperating. One of the reasons for this is that R&D 
intensity  is  indicative  of  firms’  ability to  absorb  external  knowledge  and  to  identify  new 
technological  opportunities  (Negassi,  2004).  Thus,  firms  conduct  R&D  partly  in  order  to 
increase their absorptive capacity and to take optimal advantage of their environment. They   17 
can do it through R&D co-operation. Becker and Dietz (2004), Negassi (2004) and Fritsch 
and Lukas (2001) show a positive impact of R&D intensity on R&D cooperation. Tether 
(2002) and Belderbos et al. (2004) reach the same conclusion when they distinguish several 
types  of  partners.  However,  Belderbos  et  al.  (2004)  note  that  the  R&D  variable  is  not 
significant in the equation for cooperation with competitors. Moreover, there are important 
differences between cooperation types in terms of coefficients. 
 
As in the case of the firm’ size, empirical results vary. Indeed, König et al. (1994) find no 
significant  relationship  between  R&D  intensity  and  cooperation  while  Vonartas  (1997) 
concludes  that  cooperation  is  linked  to  R&D  intensity  in  only  one  of  his  five  industrial 
sectors. Kleinknecht and Van Reijnen (1992) also find a positive impact of R&D levels only 
on cooperation with foreign R&D institutes. More recently, Lopez (2006) shows that R&D 
intensity has no significant impact on the probability of cooperating. 
 
4.1.4  Other  characteristics of a firm: Belonging to a group 
 
Belonging to a group may influence the results related to the size of the firm – results outlined 
above.   Firms that belong to larger groups are, on the one hand, able to draw on resources 
from within their group and might therefore, not need to seek as many resources externally; 
on the other hand, firms that belong to groups can draw power, security and prestige from the 
fact that they belong to a large group and then use it to gain new partners for innovation 
(Tether p.956). Empirical models find that belonging to a group has a positive effect on the 
probability to co-operate (Negassi, 2004; Kleinknecht and Van Reijnen, 1992; Tether, 2002). 
However, Belderbos et al. (2004) and Tether (2002) distinguish firms that belong to domestic 
group from those that belong to foreign group. Their conclusions concerning the probability 
to cooperate differ but it is worthwhile noting that both show that belonging to a group has a 
different influence depending on the type of partners. 
 
 
4.2  Methodology and variables 
 
The multinomial logit model is seen as a generalization of the binary logit model with a 
polytomous and unordered dependent variable. It is a non-linear model that enables us to 
examine  the  probabilities  of  the  (m+1)  different  values  of  the  dependent  variable  y.  The 
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and the estimated parameters must be interpreted in relation to the reference group (i.e. to 
value m=0).    18 
 
The estimation of the model is then performed by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
with respect to the vector of parameters( ) m ! ! ,..., 1 . This function formulated as follows:  
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In our case, the choice between j forms of collaboration is determined by the profit expected 
by  firm  (i)  from  this  form  of  cooperation  (j).  Belonging  to  Class  4  corresponds  to  the 
reference value of the explained variable
5.  
 
Appendix A describes the selected explicative variables. The R&D intensity is measured by 
the logarithm of the R&D expenditures of the firm. We also test the relative importance of 
internal information used in the innovation process. Indintsourc is the mean score of the 
importance of internal source for innovation (marketing, R&D…) at the industry level. This 
level of analysis reduces the risk of endogeneity between both variables. The size variable is 
measured by the logarithm of the number of employees. In order to test if the choice of 
cooperation mode depends on the size of the firms or on the position in the market, we also 
introduce  the  market  share  of  the firm. The  group  variable  indicates  whether  the  firm  is 
independent or belongs to a French group or to a foreign group. Six variables concerning the 
motives for cooperation are also introduced. We test the cooperation for economies of scales, 
for new markets, for competencies, for equipment, for flexibility and finally for risk sharing. 
In order to better understand the impact of the firm’s activities on this decision to cooperate, 
we also introduce variables to indicate if the firm plays a market driven role, a production and 
research role or both. 
 
The  introduction  of  spillovers  at  firm  level  can  generate  potential  endogeneity  problems 
(Belderbos et al., 2004; Lopez, 2006). Indeed, if spillovers may influence a firm’s decision to 
cooperate, a reverse effect of cooperations on incoming spillovers may also exist since firms 
may develop cooperative relations with other organizations in order to increase incoming 
knowledge flows. We then use the spillover variable at the 3-digit industry level. We suppose 
that the problem of endogeneity is smaller as the strategy of one firm should not strongly 
modify the industry variable. We build two variables of spillovers: the Indpubsourc variable 
measures  the  importance  of  public  sources  to  innovate,  at  the  industry  level  such  as 
professional conferences, meetings, journals, fairs and exhibitions. Indinstsourc measures the 
importance  of  institutional  sources  coming  from  universities  and  public  research 
organizations. We also include two measures of appropriability. Indprotstrat measures the 
strategic  protection  such  as  secret,  complexity,  lead  time.    Indprotleg represents  the  legal 
protection. We test their effects at industry level.  
 
                                                 
5 Since individuals of our dataset are firms’ relations and since a firm can describe several relations, we make 
use of the cluster option in Stata.   19 
 The results of the multinomial logit estimation are presented in Appendix B (Table 6). It 
should also be noted that a wald test rejects the null hypothesis that these categories can be 
collapsed (see Appendix  B, Table 9) indicating that significant differences between these 
cooperation strategies exist. We also have tested the validity of the Independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption since it is essential for the appropriateness of the multinomial 
logit model. We have employed a Hausman-type test provided by Hausman and McFadden 
(1984) which compares the estimated coefficients of a model using all three categories and a 
subset where one of the categories is excluded (see also, Bönte and Keilbach, 2005). We 
extended the model with five categories. If the IIA assumption holds, then the estimation of 
the restricted and the unrestricted model should provide similar estimates. The test suggests 
that the null hypothesis of IIA assumption cannot be rejected for each of the categories. As the 
Chi2  is  negative  when  class  2  and  class  3  are  separately  excluded  (see  Table  10),  we 
performed another Wald test based on seemingly unrelated estimates. The results of this test 
confirm that the IIA hypothesis is not violated
6. 
 
Finally, Appendix B (Table 7) displays marginal effects for the variables included. These can 
be interpreted as the percentage point change in the probability of choosing a particular form 
of  cooperation  given  a  1%  deviation  from  the  mean  for  continuous  variables  and  the 
percentage point change in the probability of entering a form of cooperation if a dummy 
variable changes from 0 to 1. 
 
 
4.3  Results 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the multinomial logit estimation, with Class 4 as the reference 
class.  This  means  that  the  significance  and  sign  of  the  coefficient  need  to  be  interpreted 
relatively to this class. Since such relative probabilities are hard to interpret, we choose to 
discuss  the  marginal  effects  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  the  probabilities  of  each 
cooperation type presented in Table 7. We begin with a vertical reading of the table and 
discuss the determinants and motives of each type of collaboration (4.3.1). Then we discuss 
the results for each explanatory variable (4.3.2). 
 
4.3.1 Estimation results 
The  results  suggest  that  the  probability  of  developing  a  common  structure  is  positively 
influenced by the existence of shared risk, the level of strategic appropriability and the fact 
that the firm belongs to a foreign group. Moreover, the probability increases when the firm 
performs applied research activities as part of the cooperation. However, the probability of 
choosing a common structure is reduced when firms cooperate in order to gain access to new 
markets, or to the competences or equipment of the partners. The probability of choosing this 
                                                 
6 Proofs are available upon request.   20 
strategy is also negatively influenced by the level of R&D. The higher the R&D level, the 
lower the probability of choosing this strategy
7.  
 
The probability of choosing a multi-partnership in upstream research is positively influenced 
by the size of the firm and the level of public spillovers at the industry level. Moreover, 
cooperating  in  order  to  realize  economies  of  scale  and  to  compensate  for  a  lack  of 
competencies  has  a  positive  impact  on  this  probability.  The  fact  that  a  firm  realizes 
downstream  or  mixed  activities  in  the  relation  reduces  the  probability  of  choosing  this 
strategy.  We  observe  the  same  phenomenon  if  the  firm  decides  to  cooperate  in  order  to 
compensate for a lack of equipment and if institutional spillovers at the industry level are 
high.  Thus,  firms  choose  a  multi-partnership  in  upstream  research  when  they  perform 
fundamental activities and if institutional spillovers are low. Thus such collaborations are 
aimed  at  absorbing  knowledge.  More  precisely,  when  spillovers  are  not  sufficient,  firms 
cooperate to try to obtain knowledge they can’t get freely. 
 
The probability of choosing a common market-oriented research is positively affected by the 
fact that the firm is active both in downstream and upstream activities. It also influenced by a 
marginal increase in the level of internal sources at industry level. Cooperating firms benefit 
from incoming spillovers from partners when they conduct common research projects. Public 
spillovers, strategic protection as well as the competencies, equipment and flexibility needs 
have a negative and statistically significant impact on the probability of adopting this strategy. 
We  may  suppose  that  this  type  of  cooperation  is  realized  between  competitors  as  they 
cooperate to gain access to the partner’s internal resources (i.e. internal knowledge). This is in 
keeping with Belderbos et al.’s results (2004).  
 
Firms  seem  to  adopt  subcontracting  relationships  in  order  to  compensate  for  a  lack  of 
equipment when the legal protection at industry level is high. Critically, these firms are rather 
small and they do not belong to a group. The choice of this strategy is negatively impacted by 
the fact that the partners share the risk. Moreover, firms who want to cooperate in order to 
gain access to new markets or to realize economies of scales have a lower probability of 
adopting this strategy. These collaborations are generally aimed at benefiting from better price 
and quality conditions to benefit for better condition of price and quality without risk of 
knowledge dissemination.  
 
The probability of building a contractual relationship based on a strong collaboration and 
involvement  is  positively  influenced  by  the  size  of  the  firm,  the  downward  and  upward 
activities  and  the  existence  of  a  shared  risk.  It  is  also  influenced  by  certain  cooperation 
                                                 
7 The strong correlation between  the  common structure  and belonging to  the same group indicates  that the 
common structure often represents intra-group relations. However we couldn’t include the variable group part in 
our estimation since there is a strong risk of colinearity between the variable group part and belonging to the 
same group.  
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objectives  such  as  realizing  scale  economies,  gaining  access  to  new  markets,  and 
compensating for a lack of competencies and equipment.  
 
4.3.2 Result discussion 
 
The firm’s characteristics 
The results show that the R&D level does not have any significant impact on the choice of 
type of cooperation, with the exception of the common structure. In this case, the less the 
firms invest in R&D, the more likely they are to engage in a common project. The common 
structure is mainly done with non-R&D firms. However we can suppose it could be a means 
for non-R&D firms to jointly develop R&D activities following a strategy that aims to focus 
on core business or competencies, as suggested in Section 3. 
 
Bönte and Keilbach (2005) show that in supplier-customer cooperations, the level of R&D 
has a negative impact on the decision not to cooperate but not on the type of cooperation. 
Thus, our results could suggest that R&D has an impact on the decision to cooperate as shown 
in Negassi (2004) and Fritsch and Lukas (2001) but not in the forms of the cooperation. 
Indeed,  in  the  literature,  when  cooperations  are  differentiated  according  to  the  type  of 
partners, the impact of R&D on the decision to cooperate with one type of partner is not 
constant. 
 
We propose  another measurement of the internal competencies by measuring the internal 
knowledge sources. It enables us to find out the importance of the firm’s other sources of 
knowledge (i.e. sources other than R&D). Unfortunately we only have the measurement of the 
internal sources of knowledge at the industry level. The result shows that the level of internal 
knowledge source is not significant except in the case of common market-oriented research. 
This means that the choice of a type of cooperation is not based on the firm’s level of R&D 
but that in some cases, this choice is related to the organizational structure of the knowledge 
transfer within firms. Belderbos et al. (2004) show that internal knowledge flows have a 
positive impact only on cooperation with supplier or universities.  
 
The size of the firms positively influences the  decision to develop a multi-partnership in 
upstream  research  and  a  contractual  relationship  based  on  a  strong  collaboration  and 
involvement.  This  result  confirms  our  hypothesis  on  the  link  between  size  and  upstream 
research. Firms that realize cooperation on the upstream activities are more likely to be big 
firms
8. On the other hand, the size has a negative impact on the decision to subcontract: the 
subcontracting  solution  is  more  likely  to  be  realized  by  small  firms.    Our  results  are  in 
keeping with those provided by the literature, concerning the unstable impact of the size on 
the decision to cooperate. Indeed, by distinguishing five types of cooperation, we observe the 
                                                 
8 We have tested the non-linearity effect of the size. The results (available on request) show that there is not such 
an effect.   22 
diversity found by other studies: positive impact, negative impact or no impact. This confirms 
the need to make a distinction between the different types of cooperation.  
 
The market share does not have any impact on the type of cooperation. As for R&D, we can 
suppose that the market share is a more important factor in the decision to cooperate. This 
result invalidates our hypothesis that the choice of a type of cooperation sometimes depends 
on the market structure and sometimes on the size of the firm.  
 
The Group variable is generally non significant. This means that belonging to a group does 
not  have  any  influence  on  the  type  of  cooperation  selected.  This  result  partly  confirms 
Tether’s results (2002); indeed the Group variable does not have any impact on cooperation 
with  supplier  and  competitors.  Belonging  to  a  group  does  not  influence  the  type  of 
cooperation.  However,  Tether  finds  that  belonging  to  a  foreign  group  increases  firms’ 
probability of cooperating with customers and that belonging to a domestic group increases 
firms’ probability of cooperating with a university. Similarly, we note that the Group variable 
has a significant impact in two cases which are worthwhile mentioning. Firstly, firms that 
belong to a foreign group have a high probability of developing a common structure. We 
assume that this  strategy can be a means, for foreign groups, of setting up a business in 
France. Secondly, firms that belong to a group (French or foreign) have a low probability of 
engaging in subcontracting cooperation. In this type of relations, descriptive statistics indicate 
that firms are either the ones that hire a subcontractor or are the subcontractor themselves. We 
cannot then conclude that independent firms are mainly subcontractors. However, we can 
suppose that independent firms perform less R&D activities and that they do not have the 
capacity to conduct all the stages of research processes. Conversely, these firms can also be 
good subcontractor in some very specific research.  
 
The  activities  of  the  firm  in  the  cooperation  project  influence  the  choice  of  type  of 
relationship.  The common structure is realized when firms only provide the market-oriented 
research. Firms that conduct upstream activities are more likely to choose a multi-partnership 
in upstream research. When firms perform both activities, they are more likely to undertake a 
common  market-oriented  research  or  a  contractual  relationship  based  on  a  strong 
collaboration and involvement. This result is not surprising as the type of cooperation is partly 
determined by the nature of the results. However, one could not predict that the nature of the 
activities and the nature of the results could be so highly correlated. 
 
We can conclude that the type of cooperation chosen is little influenced by the characteristics 
of the firms- with the exception of the firm’s size and the role of the firm in the relation. This 
result can be linked to the fact that firms can have different needs, which require different 
forms of cooperation. We suppose that these variables have a more important impact on the 
decision to cooperate or to not cooperate.  
 
Motives   23 
Our results confirm our hypothesis that the type of cooperation chosen depends on the reasons 
that lead the firm to cooperate. The need for scale economies explains a multi-partnership in 
upstream  research  and  a  contractual  relationship  based  on  a  strong  collaboration  and 
involvement. Conversely, it does not have any significant impact on the common structure 
and  common  research.  Finally,  firms  that  seek  to  realize  scale  economies  have  a  lower 
probability  of  engaging  in  subcontracting  cooperation.  The  wish  to  benefit  from  scale 
economies could explain the cooperative relationships that require important investments or 
those in which an upstream research project is undertaken. 
 
Firms that wish to gain access to new markets are less likely to choose a common structure or 
a subcontracting relation. They prefer a contractual relationship based on strong collaboration 
and involvement. The contract can define the rules and the rights of the market-sharing, which 
can be very important concerning innovation and knowledge.  
 
A shortage of skills can lead firms to choose a multi-partnership in upstream research or a 
contractual relationship based on strong collaboration and involvement. This reason reduces 
the probability of opting for a common structure and for a common market-oriented research. 
The search for complementary skills seems to be related to upstream research cooperation. 
When firms conduct market-oriented research they do not cooperate because of a lack of 
competencies. 
 
A  lack  of  equipment  leads  firms  to  choose  a  subcontracting  relation  or  a  contractual 
relationship based on strong collaboration and involvement. It seems difficult to consider 
these two types of relations as similar. Rather, it seems that when firms do not possess the 
equipment or the skills they need for a particular project, they opt for contractual relationships 
with  firms  that  do  possess  these  needed  resources.  When  there  is  only  an  absence  of 
equipment, firms prefer the subcontracting option.  An absence of equipment would reduce 
the probability of choosing the three other types of relations.  
 
The wish to increase flexibility does not influence the choice of relationship, except in the 
case of common market oriented research. In this case, this reason reduces the probability to 
choose this type of relations. Flexibility which can be an important factor in production does 
not seem to be important in R&D cooperation choices. 
 
Our results confirm that relations can take different forms according to the determinants of 
cooperative arrangements for innovation. They contribute to a better understanding of motives 
of cooperation. Thus cost sharing or the complementarity of skills are not always the main 
reasons for entering a relationship; it all depends on the types of cooperation.  Moreover, our 
results highlight that the reasons for cooperating are not exclusive, as shown by Sakakibara 
(1997) and Tether (2002). 
 
Knowledge spillovers   24 
There is little evidence that institutional spillovers at industry level have a significant impact 
on the probability of choosing one specific type of cooperation. For the most part they have 
no significant impact on the decision. This result invalidates Belderbos et al’s results. (2004). 
University and research institutes spillovers do not impact on the type of cooperation. We 
note  one  exception,  as  institutional  spillovers  reduce  the  probability  to  choose  multi-
partnerships in upstream research. This result is surprising as many partners in this type of 
cooperation are public labs. However, we measure institutional spillovers at the industry level. 
Our result could then indicate that when firms can easily benefit from institutional spillovers 
they do not need to cooperate with university. 
  
Public spillovers only have a positive impact on the probability to choose a multi-partnership 
in upstream research. This result is quite similar to that of Lopez (2006) on the role of public 
spillovers on cooperation with research institutions. Public spillovers influence negatively the 
probability of choosing common market-oriented research. This result is very surprising as in 
the literature we often expect a positive (or non significant) impact of public spillovers. This 
result can be compared to that concerning institutional spillovers in upstream cooperation. 
Indeed, as we use a variable at the industry level, when the level of spillovers is high, the need 
to cooperate could be reduced; free-riding behavior could be more important, as firms know 
that they will benefit from spillovers anyway. Here the spillovers occur further downstream 
than in the previous case. Finally other types of cooperation are not influenced by public 
spillovers. This confirms Belderbos et al. (2004)’s results. The importance of firms’ internal 
sources in its capacity to innovate, calculated at the industry level (Indintsourc) only has a 
strong positive impact on the probability to engage in a common research.  
 
Strategic protection at the industry level positively influences the probability of developing a 
common structure. In this case, the firm is able to protect its knowledge. Bönte and Keilbach 
(2005) find a similar result for firms that develop formal cooperative relationships. Strategic 
protection  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  probability  to  choose  common  market-oriented 
research. In the literature, strategic protection only has a negative impact on the decision not 
to cooperate (Bönte and Keilbach, 2005). The other types of cooperation are not impacted. 
This result differs from those provided by literature (Lopez, 2006) but this might be due to the 
fact that we use industry data. 
 
Legal protection at the industry level has mainly no impact on the probability to choose one 
type of cooperation. This confirms the results proposed by Bönte and Keilbach’s (2005), 
Belderbos et al (2004) and Lopez (2006). However, legal protection has a positive impact on 
the probability of engaging in subcontracting cooperation. In a context where legal protection 
is  high,  subcontracting  is  a  privileged  option  (it  is  not  a  risky  strategy  since  if  sensitive 
knowledge  or  know  how  are  protected,  the  risk  of  opportunism  by  the  subcontractor  is 
reduced).  
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Finally, we suppose that sector-based specificities could play an important role in the choice 
of the type of cooperation. Indeed, the variables defined at the industry level have, in four of 
the classes, the strongest impact on the choice of the collaboration mode. Further research in 




In this paper, we have investigated the different types of R&D collaborations and have shed 
some new light on their determinants and motives. To this aim, we have made use of a recent 
French survey on firms’ research and innovation relations. We first showed the heterogeneity 
of  such  relations  thanks  to  a  typology  on  their  characteristics:  nature  of  the  partnership 
(common research, sub-contracting, multi-partnership, management of a common structure), 
type of research (market-oriented, research-oriented, mix), its duration (short vs. long term), 
organizational  arrangement  (contract,  specific  investments).  Five  classes  of  collaborations 
have been obtained from the particular combinations of these relational characteristics:  
-  long-term relationships for the management of a common structure, 
-  multi-partnerships in upstream research, 
-  common market-oriented research, 
-  subcontracting relations, 
-  contractual relationships based on strong collaboration and involvement. 
 
Using  a  multinomial  logit  estimation,  we  explain  how  this  diversity  of  partnerships  is 
connected  to  some  individual  attributes  of  the  firms,  their  market,  or  sector  (IS, 
appropriability…).  Concerning  traditional  factors,  we  show  that  the  choice  of  a  type  of 
cooperation  is  mostly  not  determined  by  R&D  expenditure.  Our  results  also  confirm  the 
literature’s results on the unsteady impact of the size which positively influences the choice 
for  a  multi-partnership  and  a  contractual  relationship  based  on  a  strong  collaboration.  It 
negatively influences the choice of a subcontracting relation. We also find no evidence of the 
influence of market competition. Moreover, a non negligible percentage of R&D relationships 
that take the form of a common structure develop among firms that belong to the same groups 
(and are often located in different countries). When examining the motives to participate in 
the relation, we find that the search for scale economies explain the development of relations 
that involve important involvement and investments. The search for equipments is a strong 
motive  to  subcontract.  Firms  looking  for  access  to  new  markets  prefer  contractual 
relationships based on a strong collaboration and involvement. A lack of competencies leads 
firms to choose a multi-partnership in upstream research or a contractual relationship based on 
a strong involvement in it.  
 
With respect to appropriability conditions and knowledge spillovers at the industry level, we 
show that institutional spillovers have no impact on the choice of cooperative relationship, 
except on the choice of upstream research multi-partnerships on which they have a negative   26 
impact (while public spillovers have a positive influence) . Strategic protection has a negative 
impact on the probability to choose common research. Legal protection has no impact on the 
probability to choose one particular type of cooperation, except on the probability to choose 
subcontracting relationships. We also tested the influence of the geography on the relations 
but  couldn’t  find  any  significant  effects.  The  proximity  of  the  partner  is  never  a  main 
determinant for the choice of the partner. We note that subcontracting relations are often 
national or regional while the partner for the management of a common structure is often a 
affiliate of a foreigner group.  
 
All  in  all,  our  results  show  that  there  is  an  interest  in  disaggregating  R&D  cooperation. 
Indeed, there are important differences in the motives and determinants of the different types 
of  cooperation.  Thus,  R&D  collaboration  appears  to  be  a  much  more  sophisticated 
phenomenon than literature generally suggests. These results call for further research. Indeed, 
now that we have identified different types of cooperation, it is necessary to wonder about the 
complementarities  between  these  relations.  For  this  purpose,  we  propose  to  analyze  the 
different  types  of  relationships  that  firm  can  develop  and  their  impact  on  innovative 
performance. Moreover, beyond the bilateral relation, the network of each partner constitutes 
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Appendix A. The variables of the multinomial logit 
 
Explained variable  Definition  Derived from :  Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Typcoop  5-modalities variable, obtained through a typology (cf. Section 2)  Erie survey 2002 - 
Authors’ construction  
 
       
Explicative variables       
At the firm level       
R&D  Logarithm of R&D expenses  R&D survey 2002  3.968   (4.19) 
Size  Logarithm of number of employees  Erie survey 2002  5.198  (1.56) 
Part group  1 if the firm is part of a domestic group, 2 if the firm is part of a foreigner group,  
0 otherwise. 
Financial Links 2002   
Market shares  Share of the company’s total sales on total sales of the industry.  Erie/EAE 2002  0.046 (0.11) 
Risk  Shared risk in the relation  0.128 (0.33) 
Role of the firm in the relation 
•  Market oriented 
•  Mixed 
 
Market oriented role of the firm (industrial development and/or production).  
Mixed role of the firm (both industrial development and/or production and research and/or 
experimental development). 
 
Motives for the formation of the relation   
•  Scale economies  1 if the search for scale economies is an important motivation  0.150 (0.35) 
•  New markets  1: access to new markets.  0.228 (0.42) 
•  Competencies  1: search for complementary competencies.  0.405 (0.49) 
•  Equipments  1: absence of equipments.  0.205 (0.40) 
•  Flexibility  1: search for flexibility 
 
0.136 (0.34) 
At the firm’s industry level       
Indinstsourc (Institutional incoming 
spillovers) 
Mean score at the firm’s industry level* of the importance of universities and non-profit 




Indpubsourc (Public incoming 
spillovers) 
Mean score at the industry level* of the importance of professional conferences, meetings, 
journals, fairs, exhibitions as source of knowledge for innovation. 
CIS3 survey (2000)  2.186 (0.33) 
Indintsourc (Internal sources)  Mean score at the industry level* of the importance of internal source for innovation.  2.358 (0.12) 
Inprotstrat (Strategic protection)  Mean score at the industry level* of effectiveness of secrecy, complexity and/or lead time 
as a protection measure of innovation. 
0.599 (0.22) 
Indprotleg (Legal protection)  Mean score at the industry level* of effectiveness of patents and registration of brands as a 
protection measure of innovation. 
 
0.488 (0.18) 
•  3-digit Nace.   31 
Appendix B. Results 
Table 6. Results of the multinomial logit estimation 
Cooperation form 
(Class 4: subcontracting - Ref) 








Log R&Dexp  - 0.619***  - 0.006  - 0.009    0.006 
Size    0.614    0.153**    0.025    0.143** 
Part group 
- Domestic 
- Foreigner group 
 
  0.483** 
  0.698*** 
 
  0.281 
  0.087 
 
  0.347** 
  0.417** 
 
  0.308* 
  0.332 
Market shares    1.301*    0.592    0.551    0.715 
Risk    0.489**    0.345    0.227    0.930*** 
Role of the firm in the relation 
- Market oriented 
- Mixed 
 
  0.338* 
  0.428* 
 
- 0.388* 
  0.291 
 
  0.070 
  0.724*** 
 
- 0.126 
  0.918*** 
Motives 
- Scale economies 
 
  0.474** 
 
  0.715*** 
 
  0.441** 
 
  0.728*** 
- New markets  - 0.355*    0.249    0.153    0.762*** 
- Competencies  - 0.559***    0.111  - 0.345***    0.322** 
- Equipments  - 0.951***  - 0.532***  - 0.532***    0.099 
- Flexibility    0.076    0.191  - 0.362*    0.244 
Indinstsourc     0.044  - 0.321    0.284    0.239 
Indintsourc     0.064  - 0.676    1.927***    0.154 
Indpubsourc  - 0.248    1.621***  - 0.274    0.336 
Inprotstrat    1.191*    0.947  - 0.314    0.401 
Indprotleg  - 1.701**  - 1.291**  - 1.295**  - 0.653 
Constant  - 0.612  - 2.794  - 3.760**  - 3.396* 
Number of observations  3072 
Wald Chi2 (72) (Prob>Chi2)  414.39 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2  0.0569 
NB. Standard errors are adjusted for 1626 clusters (firms).  
Significant at 10% level: *; 5% level: **; 1% level: ***. 
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Table 7. Marginal effects after the multinomial logit 
Cooperation form 
(Class 4: ref) 














Log R&Dexp  - 0.006***    0.001    0.000    0.002    0.003 







  0.028 
  0.056** 
 
  0.002 
- 0.032 
 
  0.023 





  0.007 
  0.006 
Market shares    0.096    0.005  - 0.001  - 0.130    0.029 
Riskσ     0.012  - 0.007  - 0.045  - 0.080***    0.121*** 












  0.026 
  0.064** 
 









  0.001 
 






  0.053* 
- New markets
σ  - 0.062***    0.006  - 0.015  - 0.046**    0.118*** 
- Competencies
σ  - 0.058***    0.032*  - 0.072***    0.020    0.078*** 
- Equipments
σ  - 0.069***  - 0.033*  - 0.060***    0.078***    0.084*** 
- Flexibility
σ    0.010    0.033  - 0.092***  - 0.000    0.049 
Indinstsourc   - 0.004  - 0.065**    0.059  - 0.018    0.029 
Indintsourc   - 0.054  - 0.188    0.417***  - 0.113  - 0.060 
Indpubsourc  - 0.059    0.228***  - 0.141**  - 0.050    0.022 
Inprotstrat    0.116*    0.106  - 0.175*  - 0.068    0.020 
Indprotleg  - 0.100  - 0.059  - 0.107    0.217**    0.049 
Predicted (observed)  0.1293 (0.1365)  0.1624 (0.1643)  0.2891 (0.2743)  0.235 (0.2364)  0.184 (0.1885) 
NB. (σ) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Significant at 10% level: *; 5% level: 
**; 1% level: ***. 
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Table 8. Wald tests for independent variables 
Log R&Dexp  11.291 ** 
Size    9.342 * 
Part group 
- Domestic 
- Foreigner group 
 
  7.300 
12.802   **      
Market shares    3.325  
Risk  27.293 *** 
Role of the firm in the relation 






- Scale economies 
 
14.686 *** 
- New markets  36.750 *** 
- Competencies  36.665 *** 
- Equipments  42.882 *** 
- Flexibility  11.764 ** 
Indinstsourc     5.800  
Indintsourc   10.665 ** 
Indpubsourc  23.866 *** 
Inprotstrat    6.373  
Indprotleg    8.881 * 
 
 
Table 9. Wald test of the Null that respective categories can be collapsed 
Categories tested  Chi2  Df  P>Chi2 
1-2  116.320    18  0.000 
1-3  58.213     18  0.000 
1-4  108.065    18  0.000 
1-5  142.443    18  0.000 
2-3  82.123     18  0.000 
2-4  104.194    18  0.000 
2-5  68.205     18  0.000 
3-4  88.159     18  0.000 
3-5  98.403     18  0.000 
4-5  139.718    18  0.000 
 
 
Table 10. Hausman tests of IIA assumption  
Omitted  Chi2  Df  P>Chi2  Evidence 
1  7.564     57  1.000  for H0 
2  -1.567     57  1.000  for H0 
3  -1.271     57  1.000  for H0 
5  45.806     57  0.856  for H0 
NB: H0: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent  
of other alternatives. 
 